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31. PURPOSE OF THE COMMUNICATION
The concepts of “linking relief rehabilitation and development”, and of “developmental
humanitarian assistance” originate in the 1980s when both academics and practitioners voiced
concern about the so-called "grey zone" between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and
development (LRRD). This grey zone arises because humanitarian assistance differs from
development co-operation programmes. The former addresses the immediate needs of
individuals affected by crises and is provided mainly through non governmental and
international organisations. The latter aims to support autonomous development policies and
strategies and is provided mainly under co-operation programmes agreed with the partner
country. In practical terms, this can mean that aid given to implement agricultural reform in
order to improve long-term food security may not immediately improve the situation of the
populations most in need of help. The corresponding instruments and working methods differ
in their time perspective, the implementing partners, the role of national authorities and the
content of interventions.
The basic rationale for LRRD as developed by the Commission in 19961 is still valid.
Disasters and crises are costly in both human life and resources. They disrupt economic and
social development. Short-term relief mechanisms do not - and in some cases can not -
systematically take into account long-term development issues. Development policy, at the
same time, should be better prepared to cope with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises,
and the need to protect vulnerable households by helping them to develop coping strategies.
The 1996 Communication noted that if relief and development are appropriately linked, these
deficiencies can be reduced. Since then, numerous initiatives have been launched in the
Community and in international forums to facilitate a better linkage and fill obvious gaps in a
number of post-conflict situations from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Sierra Leone. The experience
accumulated since 1996, the changing institutional environment and an increasing
international consensus on better co-ordination of aid instruments suggest that the Community
should now take stock of achievements and failures, and reassess its own policies towards the
linkage issue.
Recent evaluations of Community external aid instruments have confirmed that linkages
between relief and development should be improved. Substantial EC assistance was made
available in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, which affected four Central American countries
in October 1998. This included 39 million € of emergency aid - of which 6.8 million was
decided four days after the event - and 13 million € of food aid. This emergency assistance
was delivered on time. However the implementation of the reconstruction programme to
which the EC committed 256 million €, has suffered from delays. This was due to a lack of
Commission staff to manage such a large programme. Lengthy Community procedures had
to be followed to recruit additional assistance, requiring Member States approval and the
publication of call for tenders etc. Implementation of a normal development project generally
involves a minimum of two years between identification and execution.
The pursuit of effective linkage is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition from
emergency to development assistance. It must be seen in a broader context, as part of an
integrated approach towards preventing crises and disasters, in particular through disaster
1 COM (1996)153 final of 30.4.1996
4preparedness2, as well as preventing and resolving conflicts3 and assuring a return to
structural stability. "Gaps" in the international community's response to conflicts can play a
role in the development of the conflict itself. This Communication must also be seen in the
context of the overall efforts to increase the effectiveness of the Union’s external action,
including the reform of the Community's external assistance, and to improve the quality of
development policy and of ECHO strategies.
There is no unique model or blueprint to address the question of LRRD. Each individual
situation will influence the capacity of external donors to ensure the linkage. This
Communication describes the difficulties to be addressed, recognises the limits of the
approach and identifies a range of measures that could improve the Community’s contribution
to international efforts in post-crisis situations. Proposals include the following elements:
• Firstly, on the basis of experience gained in international donor initiatives, suggestions are
made to facilitate co-ordination on a more systematic basis. The international community
must improve its response to disasters and other crises in a developmental perspective.
There are no easy solutions to complex situations. Increased co-ordination, systematic
exchange of information and better working methods could however reduce the negative
effects of the existing gaps. The paper identifies what the Community can contribute to this
process;
• Secondly, measures are proposed to readjust and streamline the Community’s own
instruments, working methods and internal institutional mechanisms. New instruments, and
additional funding are not proposed. Country Strategy Papers, which form the basis of the
new programming process for EC co-operation, must be used as the central reference for
guiding different interventions at different stages in the crisis cycle, and, through the
inclusion of conflict indicators, as a forward planning and preventative tool. This will
allow interventions to be decided in a longer term perspective. In the implementation
phase, increased flexibility and rapidity for mobilising development and co-operation
funds will be needed with a view to facilitating the take-over from emergency
interventions and, where appropriate, from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism4.
2. LRRD IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF CRISIS
Successfully linking the transition from emergency aid to rehabilitation and development
depends on the context. Each situation will be different. But to facilitate analysis, crisis
situations can simplified into three broad types: natural disasters, violent conflicts and other
crises. Each requires a different LRRD response. Obviously the dividing line between these
categories is not always clear and a country can be affected by different crises simultaneously
(drought, conflicts, etc).
2 Vulnerability assessments and the mainstreaming of disaster preparedness measures into
EC programmes will be addressed in a Communication on the integration of environment into
EC development policy.
3 The Commission is preparing a Communication on conflict prevention. It will in particular consider
ways to better integrate conflict prevention in development and co-operation programmes.
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism OJ L
057 , 27/02/2001 P. 0005 - 0009
52.1. Emergency/post-emergency created by natural disasters
Natural disasters are generally the easiest category of crisis when it comes to ensuring
effective linkage. A relatively simple operation is needed to ensure a linear, co-ordinated and
progressive transition from humanitarian aid to normal co-operation instruments. Aid can
normally be delivered in a non-hostile environment, in co-operation with governments and as
a one-off measure.
That said, such activities are not always straightforward. The response to emergency and
rehabilitation needs should not be to the detriment of long-term development programmes.
The character of linkage-related activities has to be adapted to the level of development of the
affected country. An earthquake in a Least Developed Country, such as Afghanistan, requires
more comprehensive assistance and logistics than an earthquake in a developed country such
as Turkey. International humanitarian assistance managers (ECHO, agencies, NGOs) must
co-ordinate closely with local interventions such as civil protection5, and ensure that,
whenever feasible, short term, needs-driven solutions to crises do not undermine the capacity
of local structures to strengthen their own capacities in the longer-term.
The main challenge, particularly for disaster-prone countries in which natural catastrophes
regularly occur, is both to identify appropriate disaster-preparedness measures to enhance the
self-help capacity of the population, and to prevent new disasters. This requires the
development of suitable indicators of country vulnerability and contingency planning
mechanisms. Such measures include Early Warning Systems to prevent famines resulting
from crop failures as established in many African countries (e.g. Mozambique, Ethiopia, and
Malawi).
The Mozambique flood catastrophe suggests that while there is a specific role for disaster
preparedness in the context of humanitarian assistance, the issue of reducing the country's
overall vulnerability to crises needs to be addressed over the long term. The EC strategy for
food security in Mozambique combines Early Warning Systems with structural interventions
to support agricultural development and facilitate internal and regional trade of food. .
Disaster preparedness is the only alternative to putting countries into "intensive care" every
time a crisis occurs. In countries which are victims of repeated and foreseeable natural
disasters (like periodic floods in Bangladesh, hurricanes in the Caribbean), efforts to increase
disaster preparedness must be part of long-term development strategies. The frequency and
regular severity of these disasters seriously jeopardise the already fragile development process
by undermining and reversing any accrued development gains. Where the population is
already intrinsically vulnerable due to prevailing poverty and food insecurity, the impact of
these natural disasters is all the more devastating. It is thus evident that any strategy for
improving the livelihood of the poorest segment of the population in the most disaster prone
areas, such as Bangladesh, must take into account the need to reduce their vulnerability to
these disasters.
5 Civil protection has been recognised as one of the four priority areas for civilian crisis management by the
Feira European Council (in addition to police, strengthening rule of law, and strengthening civilian
administration). The Commission's proposals for a Community mechanism for civil protection
coordination (COM (2000) 593 final) specifically envisages the mobilisation of member state civil
protection teams from willing member states to third countries where the country has requested
assistance
6The need to pay special attention to disaster preparedness has been recognised in EC policy
and programmes. For example, the new ACP-EC Partnership Agreement offers possibilities
to improve disaster preparedness in a long-term perspective. This could include support to
regional initiatives in this field, co-operation in environmental protection and sustainable
utilisation and management of natural resources as well as including disaster preparedness
mechanisms in humanitarian assistance6. In the same sense, the PRRAC (Action Plan for the
Reconstruction of Central America) adopted after hurricane Mitch seeks to strengthen the
capacity of the local authorities in the field of disaster preparedness through training and to
reduce the vulnerability of the population through awareness-raising. The Food Aid/Food
Security Budget, which can be used in a wide range of countries, provides resources to
facilitate the building of a coherent response strategy to recurring famines
To help implement these policy orientations, co-operation strategies and programmes should
identify whether the impact of natural disasters (floods, droughts, landslides) can be reduced
through preventive action (planting of trees, construction of terraces). Strategic environmental
assessments7 of economic sectors such as agriculture or forestry may help to identify policy
options that prevent overexploitation of natural resources (through for example overgrazing of
land, misplaced construction of dams, etc) which may lead to environmental problems. An
environmental assessment of the issue of land rights may help to prevent eviction of people
from traditional lands into marginal lands. Sustainable management of water resources can
help in the prevention of floods. For example, hydrological modelling of river basins
contributes to assessing the risks, and good collection and management of hydrological data is
an essential component of early warning mechanisms for water-related hazards. Such issues
will be integrated in the Country Strategy Papers.
Increased attention should be paid to disaster preparedness and prevention both in
humanitarian programmes and in development co-operation strategies
2.2. Violent conflicts
This category poses the greatest challenge to ensuring an effective linkage, particularly for
countries in protracted crises or long-lasting wars, or where there are recurrent outbreaks of
fighting. The transition from relief/humanitarian aid to development co-operation is rarely a
linear chronological process. Nor do most crises evolve in a linear way. Rather, they oscillate
between phases of deterioration, escalation, acute crisis, and de-escalation towards a more or
less stable peace8. Furthermore, reversals are frequent. Experience shows that peace or cease-
fire agreements are fragile, and donors can never be sure that they will last. The Middle East
Peace Process is associated with many emergency and rehabilitation activities in the region.
Since independence from the Soviet Union, the situation in Tajikistan remains unstable.
Angola, DRC, Afghanistan offer other illustrations of recurrent crises. Furthermore, the
phases - emergency relief, rehabilitation and development - often overlap within a single
country. In Central and Southern Somalia ‘rehabilitation’ pockets are found in highly unstable
regions. East Timor is a rare example of a fairly linear process, from a violent phase of
6 Cotonou Agreement, article 30 §1e, article 32, article 72, §3e.
7 Assessments are carried out through the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), a technique used
for identifying the environmental effects of policies, plans, programmes and groups of projects. SEA,
applied either at sectoral level or more broadly at regional level, provides the opportunity to avoid
inappropriate programmes and assists in the identification and evaluation of alternatives.
8 The different phases of conflict are described in the communication SEC(1996)332 ‘The European
Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond’
7massive destruction and forced expulsion to the take-over of the rehabilitation process by the
UN, and the gradual introduction of development co-operation.
Different funding instruments usually therefore need to be used simultaneously and there is
no uniform pattern of chronological transition between them. A linkage strategy must
consider complex sectoral and geographical aspects as well as define the appropriate timing
for linkages in a highly volatile political environment. The post-crisis strategy should take
into account the pre-crisis phase. Violent conflicts are often the culmination of rising tensions
over a period of time. The Community should therefore pay attention to factors that lead to
crises and to the mechanisms or instruments that can prevent them from escalating. Such
conflict and crisis prevention mechanisms should be integrated into development co-operation
programmes. During the crises, interventions in support of peace building are also required.
Equally important, post-crisis rehabilitation should include strengthened conflict prevention
measures in order to avoid future relapses. Donors often face a dilemma in the post-crisis
phase. Should they intervene to help implement the peace agreement as soon as it is signed
despite the political risks involved? Or should they wait for stronger evidence of a lasting
solution? In the first scenario, there is a risk of losing the funds invested if the conflict
reopens. In the second, there is a risk of undermining the peace agreement by not providing
sufficient financial support for its implementation.
Therefore the ‘link’ must be seen in a broader context: political, developmental and
humanitarian. It should be part of a consistent EU approach towards crises that links
Community and Union interventions and instruments in an integrated way. It must
complement Common Foreign Security Policy approaches and instruments. It has to become
part and parcel of EC co-operation policy and humanitarian aid. The new ACP-EC
Partnership Agreement9 contains provisions to this end. This is also the case for the new
CARDS regulation on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia,
and Macedonia10.
In post-conflict situations it is particularly difficult to reconcile humanitarian aid and
development co-operation, not least because of the difficulty in identifying appropriate
implementing partners, both at State level and amongst non-governmental organisations.
Where possible, a long-term perspective must be adopted from the start of the conflict and
influence the nature of emergency interventions. In development co-operation programmes,
particular attention must continue to be paid to the needs of affected populations in order to
stabilise the situation. Experience has shown that in post-conflict situations, special attention
must be devoted to support for the reconciliation process, institutional capacity strengthening,
regional co-operation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants,
return of refugees, the special problem of children affected by conflicts and demining
operations.
Assistance, whether of emergency or developmental, can have a negative impact if it is not
carefully planned and adjusted to the particular situation. An immediate influx of large
quantities of external resources or too long a period of emergency assistance, can encourage
corruption, diversion of aid, prolongation of the conflict and an increase in unjustified, often
uncontrollable expenditures (including military expenditure). This requires particular
attention when designing macroeconomic and sectoral support programmes, which normally
would only start in the post-conflict phase.
9 Articles 11, 30, 60, 72, 73
10 Council regulation 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000, Article 2.
8In post-conflict situations, the link between relief, rehabilitation and development must be
seen in a broader economic, social and political context. These factors must be taken into
consideration in the different phases and in the different areas of intervention.
2.3. Structural and other types of crises
Humanitarian aid instruments are currently being used in a number of countries despite the
absence of a general emergency caused either by an unexpected natural disaster or by the
outbreak of a war. Generally those countries are suffering from dire and declining political,
economic or social conditions.
Some are affected by structural crises, such as countries in transition. Ukraine, Moldova,
Belarus and the Russian Federation are all recipients of humanitarian assistance from ECHO.
Difficulties in these countries can be aggravated by weak, emerging or disintegrating state
institutions. In some of them, appropriate development instruments that could facilitate the
transition from emergency to stability either do not exist, or are not backed up by sufficient
financial resources to meet the needs (physical rehabilitation), or else provide only one type
of support (food aid, technical assistance). This is particularly true for countries whose main
support is provided through the Tacis Regulation.
Other countries are characterised by the absence of the rule of law, and are under partial or
total suspension of EC co-operation, other than humanitarian aid. This may have occurred
because of lack of respect for the human rights and democracy provisions of the Treaty, (and
where present, of EC co-operation or partnership agreements). In the absence of EC
development assistance programmes, a smooth transition may not be possible. In certain
cases, the Commission may nonetheless decide that ECHO assistance is no longer
appropriate, even though this will mean a reduction in EC assistance.
In specific cases, assistance can be provided after ECHO’s withdrawal eventhough
development assistance is not formalised in an agreed document with the beneficiary
country.Cuba is such a case. where humanitarian instruments were used in the absence of a
humanitarian crisis. A decision was made in 2000 to move from ECHO-funded operations to
projects supported by other budget lines (ALA, Food aid, NGOs, etc.), while capitalising on
the work done so far. An independent evaluation has since pointed at the negative effects of
continued humanitarian aid. The co-operation strategy, while still within the limits imposed
by the Council Common Position, has since then been reviewed with a view to better using
the different instruments and to adapting co-operation to the Cuban situation.
East Timor illustrates the problem of switching from emergency relief to development in the
absence of functioning institutions. After the post-referendum crisis in 1999, ECHO-funded
NGOs responded to the humanitarian and health emergency. By the end of 2000, a number of
emergency-oriented NGOs had been replaced by more development-oriented NGOs still
mostly funded by ECHO (until May/June 2001). However the role of these NGOs has
changed from providing emergency aid to being public health services providers at district
level. In the meantime, while the development of a public health system has made some
progress, all parties agree that this situation is neither sustainable nor desirable in the long
run. Alternatives are being actively pursued. The case of Timor, where OCHA took an
effective leading role, also demonstrated the need to co-ordinate transition strategies.
In all these cases the provision of humanitarian aid creates dilemmas. Humanitarian aid can
be justified to meet the needs of the most vulnerable strata of the population ("poverty
pockets") on a temporary basis, and to bridge specific hardship caused by one-off extreme
9events. But all donors - and some evaluations of EC aid11 - have identified the negative and
potentially distorting effects of prolonged humanitarian aid, such as the creation of
dependency, and the fuelling of tension12. Humanitarian aid may take the reform pressure off
the recipient countries. But it can not address the structural causes of the problems, and is not
an appropriate substitute for sustainable social and economic policies.
Given this, while some improvements can be made to humanitarian assistance by better
targeting existing interventions towards populations in need, a gradual phasing out of
humanitarian assistance is necessary. There are also budgetary arguments. ECHO should
therefore focus on its "core mandate", i.e., life-saving operations in emergencies which aim
for the earliest possible exit, combined with a co-ordinated and progressive transition from
humanitarian aid to normal co-operation instruments. The main challenge is to identify the
appropriate instruments that can take over from humanitarian assistance and to mobilise them
in a timely fashion taking into account each instrument's funding cycle and limitations.
There are other EC instruments which can contribute. The European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights can provide support to civil society in areas concerning human rights,
democracy and the rule of law. Interventions in support of food aid and food security, mainly
implemented through non governmental organisations, can also help to establish favourable
conditions for a dialogue on key sectoral policies. Economic decline often induces structural
food insecurity. For countries affected by high indices of food insecurity such as Georgia,
Armenia or Kyrgyzstan, support from the food security budget line can promote the structural
reforms necessary to improve institutional and legal frameworks and remove obstacles to food
production and trade (e.g. trade infrastructure, customs procedures and regulations, tariff and
non-tariff barriers). Such interventions are primarily by sector, given the particular situation
of these countries, are so far not part of an overall co-operation strategy. They will in the
future be integrated into the Country Strategy Papers.
However, while the EC's food security budget line may help to bridge the gap in some
situations, it is not always appropriate and the resources available are far from sufficient to
meet the needs of all countries affected by this problem.
ECHO should focus on its core mandate. Assistance to countries where there is no
humanitarian emergency should be phased out. If the EC is nonetheless committed to
continue its assistance, appropriate longer term instruments will have to be mobilised in a
timely fashion, where the legal framework to do so exists.
3. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATIONMECHANISMS
3.1. The need for improvements
Delivery of aid to disaster-stricken countries is difficult. Donor co-ordination is often
insufficient, reducing the impact and effectiveness of external interventions. The main factors
explaining the weakness or lack of co-ordination in post-crisis situations include a multitude
of actors in highly visible crises (as experienced in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda); donors’
diverging national interests; different assessments of situations and objectives, or political
analyses; the difficulty of mobilising funds in an appropriate and timely manner due to
11 Assessment and future of Community humanitarian activities, COM (1999) 468 final of 26.10.1999
12 DAC Guidelines on conflict , peace and development co-operation, 1997, Section III.
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inadequate operational tools and instruments; slow and centralised decision-making
proceduresIn addition, in countries coming out of conflict, donor interest may increase at the
time of a peace settlement. However once the political momentum wears off and the dramatic
effects of the crisis disappears, particularly from the media, donor interest, and “donor
incentive”, tends to subside. This is above all true for countries that have been involved in
long term or recurrent armed conflicts such as Somalia, Sudan or the Congo. The result is that
the specific needs of countries and populations in highly vulnerable post-crisis situation are
not met optimally. In Guinea-Bissau, after the return to democracy in early 2000, the support
provided by donors was not sufficient to stabilise the post-conflict situation, leading to
renewed tensions and problems a few months later. In Liberia, despite earlier commitments,
very few donors have intervened since 1998. The EC aid programme has been the most
significant one in recent years. The Western Saharan crisis has lasted many decades and
ECHO is almost the only donor providing support to Saharawis refugees in Algeria.
There have been some improvements. There are more examples of co-ordinated projects, and
better sharing of information. The high costs and dangers resulting from uncoordinated action
have been recognised. Somalia is a good example of successful donor co-ordination. In the
absence of national authorities, a specific co-ordination mechanism, the Somalia Aid co-
ordination Body (SACB), has been created with all members of the international aid
community active in Somalia. It has played a key role in contacts with Somali local and
regional authorities, in planning aid, facilitating the implementation of projects and ensuring
the link between emergency and rehabilitation.
At the same time, much remains to be done to achieve a concerted donor strategy. The
Rwanda evaluation13 found co-ordination performance was mixed, and made a number of
recommendations to address the weaknesses identified.
Furthermore, the visibility of common European efforts and of the actions undertaken by the
international community as a whole should be improved. After the earthquake in Turkey, for
example, the media coverage concentrated on each donor’ interventions on a national basis.
Massive media coverage of the Mozambique floods prompted donors to ensure the visibility
of their efforts to support the victims and contributed to increasing the number of donors
providing emergency aid. On the other hand competition for visibility may have been a
disincentive for real international co-ordination.
A pro-active approach to co-ordination is needed. Due to its importance both as a donor of
emergency assistance and of development assistance, as well as to its broad international
presence, the European Commission has a particular responsibility in improving co-
ordination. EC emergency assistance is an important part of its external aid, as it represents
14% of EC assistance to developing countries, compared to 7% for the DAC as a whole.
The Council and the Commission have recently adopted a joint Statement14 that reorients the
Community’s development policy towards the internationally agreed development strategy.
This Statement has also been welcomed by Parliament. Better complementarity will be sought
both within the Union and with other donors, in particular in the context of country-by-
country strategies. This is an important part of the efforts to improve the quality of
development policy. In post-crisis and other difficult situations it is particularly relevant. The
Commission must relate from the beginning of a crisis to what other donors are doing and
13 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996
14 Statement by the Council and the Commission on the EC’s development policy, 10 November 2000.
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contribute to a coherent international aid effort in vulnerable post-crisis situations. This
includes efforts, together with other major international donors and actors, to increase
visibility of individual donors within the framework of common crisis interventions.
Insufficient donor co-ordination in post-crisis situationsis reducing the efficiency and impact
of the assistance provided, thereby increasing the political risk.
3.2. Co-ordination and complementarity between the EC and its Member States
The Council adopted Conclusions in October 2000 on the effectiveness of the Union’s
external action and the need to improve co-ordination and complementarity between the
Commission and Member States. This is as true for post-crisis situations, and the need to link
relief, rehabilitation and development, as it is for other assistance.
Improved information sharing between Commission and Member States at all levels is
essential to more effective co-ordination of the identification, preparation and implementation
of actions. Following the earthquake in Gujarat in January 2001, the Commission established
a local centre, ERIC, to promote co-ordination between member state donors, and to raise the
EU's overall profile. This proved successful and the Commission intends to continue this co-
ordination role in the subsequent rehabilitation and reconstruction phase.
The need to link relief, rehabilitation and development will be integrated into discussions of
Country Strategy Papers for unstable countries. Joint meetings at field level and between the
Humanitarian Aid Committee and the geographical committee on specific countries or issues
could be considered. The aim should be a division of labour between the Commission and
Member States, including co-financing, in particular where rehabilitation requires
interventions outside the EC's focal areas. In this process, increased co-ordination on the
ground is essential. Delegations will play a crucial role in identifying possible areas of
synergy and complementarity and in defining strategic orientations.
The linkage issue should be taken into account in the ongoing discussions on improving co-
ordination and complementarity.
3.3. Co-ordination with the UN and other international initiatives
The United Nations play a unique role in pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis situations. In this
context the so-called "Brookings Process" and the “Friends of” approach provide useful
frameworks for exchange of information and co-ordination. The ‘Brookings Process’, which
started in January 1999, has been facilitated by the Brookings Institution with a roundtable
discussion on possible international mechanisms to bridge the gap between humanitarian and
long-term development assistance in vulnerable post-conflict situations. It is meant as an
informal gathering of donors, launched by the World Bank and UNHCR, with a view to find
practical ways of improving donor co-ordination, and raise contributions to crises that have
attracted relatively less attention.
The "Friends of" approach proceeds along similar lines. It involves the broadest possible
number of international donors co-ordinating their actions in a particular country. This
approach was adopted in Sudan, Afghanistan, East Timor, Tajikistan. Those initiatives are
however still in their infancy, with the notable exception of East Timor where it is more
advanced. Practical ways of bridging the gap between emergency and development assistance
still need to be explored and the process should be strengthened.
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Closer co-operation (under the form of a "Partnership Initiative") was established for Sierra
Leone. Plans for a Strategic Framework for Sierra Leone were drawn up taking the 'gap' into
account. Several informal donor meetings took place in 1999 to agree on a number of priority
actions designed to support the peace agreement, namely funding disarmament,
demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants. In the end, however, these actions were
only implemented partially and not quickly enough to prevent another outbreak of the civil
war in May 2000. The Brookings meeting of 15/16 November 2000 agreed to set up working
teams for a limited number of pilot countries: Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda and, possibly
Indonesia. The teams will elaborate by February 2001 a joint plan to achieve better linkages
for those "pilot" countries. A website to exchange information on strategies and projects will
be set up. On the basis of this information the team can then identify gaps in financing and
develop proposals on how to fill them.
In East Timor, the UN was pro-active in co-ordinating donors, with a special unit to gather
and exchange information.
A case-by-case approach is needed. Nonetheless both frameworks should be more
systematically used and set up when a crisis erupts in order to integrate the linkage issue from
the very start. Without wishing to propose a pre-ordained - and therefore rigid - system, the
Commission believes that organisational improvements are needed in order to achieve greater
effectiveness of the “friends of” approach. This could include ground-rules concerning the
identification of responsibilities for co-ordination if the country is not in a position to do so,
and the setting up of a systematic and adequate information exchange mechanism on
individual donors’ interventions. A user-friendly and decentralised system using modern
information technology will allow the rapid exchange of information on who is doing what.
The Commission is willing to participate actively in such initiatives and could for example
provide co-ordination facilities.
The Commission should play an active role in strengthening the “Friends of” approach.
3.4. Other actors in a more organised “Friends of” approach
Co-ordination and coherence are necessary preconditions for effective action during the whole
spectrum of the crisis cycle. Wherever possible, shared strategic frameworks for action should
be agreed taking into account the local, national, regional and international context.
Conflict situations almost always lead to deteriorating social indicators and an increased level
of poverty, thereby often exacerbating existing problems. Strategies that address these
problems and assist in stabilising an extremely fragile social and economic environment are
essential. For many of these countries an early access to debt relief is vital. The concept of
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and a co-ordinated approach is highly relevant
for countries in post-conflict situations. Where they exist, PRSPs will also become the basis
for EC Country Strategy Papers and development assistance programming.
Since the start of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 1996, the case of post-
conflict HIPC countries has been given a lot of attention. The recent decision of the WB and
IMF Boards to extend the sunset clause15 to end-2002 will allow more countries, particularly
those in post conflict situations, to take the necessary steps in order to enter the HIPC debt
15 The sunset clause defines the deadline for countries to apply for the HIPC initiative. It was initially
fixed at end 2000 and has been extended to end 2002.
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relief process. The debt problems of those countries will be treated on a case-by-case basis,
taking account of the specific constraints of post-conflict countries when assessing their
reforms and the sustainability of debt profiles. This is also an important aspect of a co-
ordinated strategy.
Other specific instruments such as Trust Funds could in principle help. However they do not
appear to be systematically the best suited instrument in post-crisis situations. Indeed,
evaluations of the use of Trust Funds in Rwanda, DRC and Sierra Leone have shown rather
mixed results. The lack of visibility of each donor’s actions is a major impediment to their
contributing to global funding mechanisms.
International and local NGOs and other civil society groups should also be associated with
discussions of strategic orientations and participate in co-ordination mechanisms. This is
consistent with the new development policy approach, which encourages increased
participation of a broad range of civil society actors in dialogues on strategies and in the
implementation of co-operation programmes. Civil society has valuable expertise and
knowledge. “Friends of” experiences have shown their participation to be useful. A dialogue
forum should be established on the spot to exchange experiences on projects, identify best
practices and share information. The Commission delegation could facilitate this, for example
by convening informal meetings and workshops. This should as far as possible be integrated
into the “friends of” approach”.
Despite occasional negative regional dynamics (Great Lakes region), regional engagement
should be supported and the role of regional organisations (OAU, SADC, ECOWAS,…) be
strengthened in post-conflict situations. Neighbouring countries, regional organisations and
other potential or interested parties should be encouraged to participate in the “Friends of”
process. This is fully consistent with EC support to regional co-operation processes as well as
the EU's partnerships and dialogues undertaken with groups of countries.
Better organised and increased co-ordination between the various multilateral, regional and
non-governmental actors should strengthen the synergies in the international response to
crises.
4. TOWARDS AN EC LINKAGE STRATEGY
The European Union (EC and Member States together) is the largest donor of humanitarian
aid providing 58% of total DAC emergency aid in 1999 (of which 16% for the EC alone). Its
share in long term development assistance represents some 50% of international Official
Development Assistance (of which some 10% by the EC alone). In view of its importance as
a donor, the Commission must develop a strategic framework to ensure linkage between the
different EC instruments.
The Commission's overall objectives are to reinforce the strategic framework in which it
intervenes, from the outset of a crisis, up to the resumption of normal development co-
operation, and to increase its efficiency, speed and flexibility. Problems encountered in
bridging the gaps between relief and development have already partly been addressed in the
framework of the reform of the Community's external assistance16. 'Deconcentration' which
will provide Commission delegations in the field with more staff and more decision-making
16 SEC (2000) 514 of 16 May 2000
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power will help, as will a clearer definition of the roles of the Commission and Member
States in the approval of strategies, programmes and projects (the “comitology” procedures).
There are other problems which are more specific to ensuring effective « linkage ».
4.1. Main problems to be addressed
There are three main problems in ensuring linkage between emergency instruments (ECHO,
RRM) and development and co-operation instruments: slow decision-making procedures,
choice of implementing partners and the ability to mobilise resources through appropriate
instruments.
Procedural constraints and delays arise from the regulations themselves and ex-ante control
mechanisms. Evaluations have confirmed the need for more flexible and speedy procedures,
including for the Rehabilitation Regulation17. An evaluation of the budget line for aid to
uprooted people in ALA countries18 over the period 1997-99 identified several procedural
constraints and noted increased delays in the signing of contracts, recruitment of technical
assistance, transfer of funds and approval of amendments to financing agreements. A recent
evaluation of rehabilitation actions in ALA and MED countries19 showed that the current
procedures for the rehabilitation budget lines have not contributed to effectiveness, as they did
not provide a quick disbursement capacity or increased flexibility in decision-making. There
was no evidence of successful articulation between phases and instruments; and the
evaluation also revealed a lack of mechanisms to ensure coherence with country strategies for
Asia, Latin American and Mediterranean countries.
Slow decision-making procedures undermining the EU's ability to react to a crisis were the
main reason that the Commission proposed the establishment of the Rapid Reaction
Mechanism. This permits short term interventions, for not longer than six months. It has
world-wide coverage and it can mix a number of measures under one intervention according
to the needs of the crisis. The basis of the Mechanism remains existing Community
instruments (listed in the Regulation) capable of providing a large spectrum of actions and
reactions to alleviate crises. These can include human rights work, election monitoring,
institution building, media support, border management, humanitarian missions, police
training and the provision of police equipment, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation,
reconstruction, pacification, resettlement and mediation. These same Community instruments
will, in turn, remain the basis for any possible follow-up measure which might be required
after the first emergency operation has elapsed. The main purpose of the RRM is to deliver
urgent support to preserve or re-establish the civic structures necessary for political, social
and economic stability and to be a precursor for eventual longer-term assistance.
The necessary approval of projects by governments represents another constraint in some
crisis situations. The major development and co-operation instruments (EDF, Tacis,
MEDA…) are based on the principle of partnership and cannot be used without the
involvement of the government of the country concerned. Some governments may be
unwilling or unable to take over projects from ECHO-funded NGOs, particularly if they are
located in areas controlled by the opposition. They may also be reluctant to finance certain
actions, for example in support of peace processes or reconciliation. In some exceptional
cases (Somalia, Congo, Rwanda) the Commission has had to take over the role of the
17 Regulation (CE) N° 2258/96
18 Evaluation of Budget Line “Aid for uprooted people in ALA countries 1997-1999”, Council regulation
443/97, Synthesis Report September 2000.
19 Report of the desk phase, August 2000.
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National Authorising Officer. In others, development resources are not available and other
financial resources managed on an autonomous basis by the Commission must be found
(rehabilitation, refugees budget-lines or NGO co-financing). This is the case for example for
Liberia: given that the signature of the indicative programme had been delayed for several
months, the resources earmarked for aid to refugees managed with more flexible procedures
had to be used.
The Commission has a wide range of implementing partners for emergency aid and for
development programmes. In 2000, some 65% of EC humanitarian assistance was used to
finance NGOs projects, 20% was channelled through the UN family (of which 5% to the
World Food Programme) and some 15% via the Red Cross movement and other international
organisations. Implementing partners, including NGOs, are often specialised and competent
either in emergency or in development. This makes ensuring continuity with a specific set of
NGO partners difficult since partners and working methods may change abruptly in the
transition from emergency to development assistance. For example, following the
Mozambique floods, of the forty proposals received in the framework of the programme
designed to take over from emergency relief, only two were from the NGOs who had been
involved in the emergency relief phase. The bulk of proposals were submitted by
‘development’ NGOs. In Lebanon, ECHO projects agreed on the strength of NGO proposals
made only marginal reference to the EU Partnership Agreement and MEDA programme; a
separate group of NGOs put forward different ideas for rehabilitation funding, with limited
relevance to the ECHO programme (with only one rehabilitation project, concerning
demining, likely to be a natural extension of an activity begun under ECHO).
A change and broadening of implementing partners may be required in the transition phase.
This requires looking beyond NGOs and UN agencies to other bodies, including local
organisations, the private sector and consultants for technical studies. Where a decision is
made to continue with NGOs, preference should be given to those NGOs that have acquired a
proven competence in both emergency relief and development.
The problem relating to mobilisation of resources is primarily due to the existence of
multiple instruments and budget lines, for example for rehabilitation, which is funded from
individual geographical budget lines. This increases complexity, and reduces flexibility,
leading to gaps in coverage in an area where rapid interventions are required, especially as
these cannot necessarily be predicted over a year in advance when drawing up the budget. In
the South Caucasus and Central Asia, a smooth transition from ECHO funding to other
programmes is a challenge both because of the nature of current Tacis assistance and its legal
base, and because of the insufficiency of financial resources available under the specific
TACIS rehabilitation budget line (only € 1.7 m available in 2000). The Food Aid/Food
Security budget line has proved to be appropriate for linking relief and development
assistance. However, resources are not sufficient to cover all countries potentially
concerned20.
4.2. Adapting the Country Strategy Papers
“Country Strategy Papers”21 are the main tool used to programme EC assistance. On the basis
of an analysis of the partner country’s situation, EC priorities and the activities of other major
partners, they will be used to guide, manage and review EC assistance programmes for all
21 Standard framework adopted by the Council, 10 November 2000.
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developing countries receiving assistance from the European Development Fund, under the
ALA and MED programmes, and progressively for other countries.
The linkage issue will become an integral part of the CSP in countries where crises and
emergencies, or the potential for them exists, particularly where ECHO is active. This will
allow the EC to take into account the pre-crisis phase and the opportunities to prevent or
prepare for disaster and prevent conflict. It will also enable the planning of the transition from
the emergency to the development phase. Such an approach is already foreseen for the ACP
countries in the Cotonou Agreement which explicitly refers to the linkage issue22. It is also the
case for the new CARDS programme for the Western Balkans, which focuses on
reconstruction and stabilisation as on well on longer term objectives of sustainable economic
and social development23. For countries in conflict, the CSP will focus on EC’s role in peace
building and resolution, which includes linking relief, rehabilitation and development. For
countries facing recurrent natural disasters, disaster preparedness must be part of long-term
development strategies. From an environmental viewpoint, it can be addressed through
appropriate methodologies, namely Country Environmental Profiles and Environmental
Assessments. For countries affected by structural crises, institution building and the
reinforcement of the capacity of non-state actors must become an integral part of the CSP.
CSPs should also address the trade potential and the necessary strategies and reforms to
increase productivity and trade.
When ECHO or the RRM starts intervening in a country, the need to adapt the CSP will be
considered. Even if the CSP remains valid for the long-term development perspective, the
crisis will affect co-operation activities. Therefore an Addendum to the CSP will be prepared
in close co-operation with partners in the field. For the ACP countries this process
corresponds to the ad-hoc reviews foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement24 and to the new
system established for programming and resource allocation25. These provisions allow for the
use of flexible and effective procedures. For the Mediterranean countries a comparable review
process, required by unforeseeable circumstances, is also foreseen in the new MEDA
regulation26. An ad hoc review process is also foreseen for the Western Balkans27. Similar ad
hoc reviews could be used in other regions.
The Addendum to the CSP will be based on an analysis of the situation and include
information on other donors’ interventions, in particular those of Member States. It will
define strategic orientations, objectives and priorities. It will link and integrate different
interventions and instruments in a mutually interdependent way. In most cases there is no
chronological transition between different instruments but simultaneous funding. To establish
the link between relief and development, immediate planning is required not only in short-
term relief responses, but also in short and medium-term rehabilitation and development
actions. This must include where possible a phasing-out for ECHO (the RRM is legally
required to phase out after six months and another EC instrument should take over, where
necessary).
22 Cotonou Agreement, Article 11 §5.
23 Council regulation 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000, Article 2§2.
24 Cotonou Agreement, Article 5§2 of annex IV foresees that in exceptional circumstances related to
humanitarian and emergency assistance, a review of the country strategy and the indicative programme
can be carried out on the demand of either party.
25 Use of the allocation aimed at covering unforeseen needs.
26 Council regulation 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000, Article 5§2.
27 Council regulation 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000, Article 3§1(a)
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Humanitarian and development co-operation approaches need to be better matched. In
Somalia, free distribution of drugs took place in so-called ‘emergency areas’, whereas in so-
called ‘rehabilitation areas’, sometimes in nearby neighbourhoods, cost-sharing mechanisms
were introduced. Therefore humanitarian interventions should be designed in such a way that
they take into account long-term objectives and sustainability, whereas development
programmes should increasingly take into consideration the needs of populations as identified
in the rehabilitation phase, as well as evolving requirements.
The Addendum will be elaborated by inter-disciplinary teams, since case studies and
evaluations have clearly demonstrated that continued internal co-ordination is a key to
success. Such groups have shown themselves useful, for example in Mozambique. While the
establishment of a working group is necessary to ensure the linkage, it nonetheless can cause
problems of timing: it may add to the reaction time for humanitarian relief, while reducing it
from the development perspective. The key is to ensure an immediate decision to set up the
working group, as well to allocate sufficient staff to it in a flexible manner. Another example
of a successful linkage can be found in the Kosovo crisis. The co-ordination mechanisms set
up in this case ensured an unprecedented level of co-ordination within the Commission both
at headquarters and field level. A crucial factor for success has been the rapid establishment
and deployment of the Commission Task Force in the Kosovo province, preceding the
Agency for Reconstruction, in parallel with the ECHO presence.
The Addendum to the CSP will be adopted in line with the procedures in the applicable
instruments, using the maximum degree of flexibility legally available under each instrument.
It will cover the actions envisaged and the different instruments to be used, so that no
subsequent approval of individual projects is required, only information The Addendum to the
CSP will also assess the type of skills required and identify appropriate partners. They will as
far as possible be discussed and agreed with the partner country.
The Commission will propose simplified and accelerated procedures for the adoption and
modification of such Addenda. Experience shows that the evolution of crises, in particular
conflicts, is unpredictable and therefore the Addendum to the CSP must ensure sufficient
flexibility to allow quick adaptations to changing and unexpected situations. The common
objective should be to agree on strategic orientations and leave the maximum degree of
flexibility to elaborate and implement work programmes and projects on very short-term
basis.
As soon as ECHO or the RRM starts intervening, an Addendum to the Country Strategy Paper
including an indicative work programme will be elaborated and adopted using simplified and
accelerated procedures.
4.3. Tools and instruments
The Commission is reassessing its own operational tools and instruments to identify areas
where linkages can be improved. This review takes place in the framework of the reform of
the EC's external assistance. The Commission objective is not to create new financial
instruments to ensure a better linkage but to improve existing instruments and their links
where possible. A reduction in the number of budget lines is also important, since it is
essential to permit increased effectiveness and flexibility in the management of external aid in
crisis situations.
Some of the EC's thematic instruments (i.e. those addressing broad sectoral issues) are
particularly relevant in the immediate post-crisis situation and are relatively well-adapted for
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ensuring linkage. This is the case for rehabilitation and reconstruction, aid to refugees and
internally displaced persons, food aid/food security, and demining. Others can be used in a
complementary way, such as support to democratisation and respect for human rights, NGO
co-financing and decentralised co-operation.
Regulation (CE) N° 2258/96 for rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing
countries can be a useful instrument to complement long term development programmes and
could also be used to continue finance for actions started in the framework of the Rapid
Reaction Mechanism. Procedures for its use, however, need to be improved. As a first step,
the Commission will propose the merger of the five existing geographical ‘rehabilitation
budget-lines’28 into a single line covering all regions. This is necessary to ensure flexibility in
response to crisis situations which can rarely be accurately predicted on a geographical basis
over a year ahead.
In addition, the scope of the existing Regulation and its associated procedures should be
reviewed on the basis of evaluations and the Court of Auditors' report, and taking into account
the effect of the reform of external assistance, including comitology and internal procedures.
If it is to be more effective as a 'linkage' instrument, this may require greater emphasis to be
put on the restoration of institutional capacities and the rebuilding of the social fabric, and not
only onphysical rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.
The Commission's proposal for a new Regulation for aid for uprooted people in Asia and
Latin American countries29 includes appropriate provisions to ensure better linkage.
Operations under the proposed Regulation are designed gradually to take over from
emergency aid and facilitate the transition to a development strategy. They therefore form part
of an overall rehabilitation strategy for people who are or have been affected by internal or
external conflict.
As part of the forthcoming evaluation and review of the Asia/Latin America Regulation (CE)
N° 443/92, the Commission will also examine the arguments for and against merging the
activities undertaken by some of the existing 'horizontal regulations' into the main
geographical instruments. Possible candidates for such mergers would be aid to
refugees/uprooted people and the Rehabilitation Regulation.
In addition to consolidating the number of legal bases and budget lines, a merger would have
the advantage of integrating within one legal basis a broad range of activities in any country.
This would be consistent with the aim of promoting linkage. However it would be necessary
to ensure that a wider Regulation still permitted the existing scope of activity, allowed for
sufficiently accelerated decision-making, flexibility in selecting implementing partners, and
for decisions to be taken without the agreement of the government concerned.
The Tacis Regulation, which does not currently allow for rehabilitation activity, is next
reviewed in 2006. If a merger into the main geographical regulations of some of the
horizontal regulations such as refugees and rehabilitation were pursued, a separate legal basis
for rehabilitation in Tacis countries would need to be retained in the interim (i.e. the existing
Regulation 2258/96).
28 Budget lines B7-303 Asia, B7-313 Latin America, B7-411 Mediterranean, B7-522 Caucasus and
Central Asian Republics, B7-641 ACP.
29 COM (2000) 831 of 20 December 2000.
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The alternative to merging instruments is to continue to rely on the Country Strategy Paper as
the main tool to promote the coherence of different instruments within countries, and to
ensure linkage, as previously described. CSPs should cover both the main legal basis/budget
line(s) for development assistance, and the separate horizontal instruments/global budget lines
for specific post-crisis interventions.
Food aid and food security operations are good instruments for ensuring linkages as short
term and long term aspects can both be covered. Thirty percent of its funding is provided for
crisis operations (through WFP and NGOs). The remaining funding is used for structural
support to food security policies, including support to establishment the conditions needed to
start longer-term reform processes. This demonstrates the variety of situations where it can
intervene and the flexibility of the instrument. An evaluation of this instrument is planned
which will inter alia address questions of linkage and the relationship of this instrument to
other Community instruments.
Demining activities are important in a number of pre- and post-crisis situations, and can be an
integral part of humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, reconstruction or development projects.
Although life saving and human security elements are the core targets of mine actions, the
socio-economic impact of antipersonnel landmines (APL) on populations and their negative
effects on efforts to reduce poverty and instability cannot be ignored. It is therefore important
that the APL issues be integrated into the CSPs and considered within the development cycle
of the country. A socio-economic impact assessment of the APL threat is becoming a regular
feature in the Commission's approach to regional strategic Mine Action programming. The
proposal for a Regulation currently under discussion establishes a clear link between mine
actions and overall co-operation strategies with third countries. It foresees possible
complementary funding30.
As regards NGO cofinancing, the General Conditions issued in January 2000 foresee giving a
priority to, inter alia, developing countries undergoing rehabilitation.
Council Regulations 975/99 and 976/99, the legal bases for human rights and democratisation
activities under Chapter B7-7 of Community budget ('the European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights'), provide for three possible areas of intervention: protection of human
rights; democratisation; and conflict prevention and dealing with conflict consequences in
terms of human rights, in particular through support to civil society organisations but also
international organisations. These Regulations foresee accelerated procedures for financing
projects under 2 M€ in emergency situations. They can therefore be deployed rapidly in pre-
and post-conflict situations, and complement other EC activity.
In general, except for the new ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and for the programme
CARDS for the Western Balkans, the other large EC regional programmes (MEDA, Tacis,
Asia and Latin America) are currently not well suited to allow for linkage between relief and
development in a flexible and timely manner in post-crisis situations.
Tacis is mainly a technical assistance programme with some scope for undertaking investment
actions. It focuses on support to democratisation and the transition process towards market-
based economies. The Commission may consider whether the scope of Tacis actions should
be extended.
30 Modified proposal for a Council Regulation concerning action against anti-personnel landmines,
Articles 1§2 and 2§4
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While MEDA does not focus on rehabilitation or crisis issues, it nevertheless allows some
kind of take-over of projects from the emergency phase. This has for example been the case in
Lebanon for demining.
As regards co-operation with the ACP countries, the Cotonou Agreement offers more
flexibility than in the past to cope with the linkage issue. In particular:
1) in countries where the crisis occurs once a Country Strategy Paper and an indicative
programme already exist, the following steps can be taken: a review of the indicative
programme will take place on the demand of either party, and operations will be decided with
a view to easing the transition from the emergency phase to the development phase using
effective and flexible mechanisms31; where budget funding is not available, emergency and
rehabilitation interventions may be financed from the European Development Fund; in any
case resources will continue to be available to non-State actors, in particular the share of the
long term envelope to which they have direct access32.
2) in countries where, due to exceptional circumstances, no indicative programme has been
signed, the Cotonou Agreement foresees that a specific mechanism will be put in place33. This
involves the following elements: except in cases where EC co-operation has been suspended
following the procedures of Articles 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement34, a global
allocation of resources will be decided and notified; however in view of the difficulties of
engaging in a normal programming exercise, only specific measures will be adopted,
consistent with the CSP, with a view to ensuring a proper linkage between relief and
development assistance. Here again, where budget funding is not available, recourse should
be made to EDF funding through the so-called “B allocation”, established to cover unforeseen
needs35. Humanitarian as well as post-emergency action aimed at physical and social
rehabilitation may be undertaken in this framework, using effective and flexible mechanisms.
Resources will also be made directly available to non-State actors.
The CARDS programme will provide Community assistance for reconstruction, aid for the
return of refugees and displaced persons, and stabilisation of the region as well as for
institutional development, economic reforms, social development, environmental
rehabilitation and regional cooperation.
The reform of the Commission has already gone a long way in their assessing and proposing
reforms to internal procedures. This process needs to be reinforced with a specific focus on
the linkage issue. The Commission is reviewing its internal procedures and will propose
simplified and more flexible decision-making procedures to be applied as soon as the
Addendum to the CSP and the attached work programme have been elaborated. Flexibility
must still be increased generally, even if some improvements have already taken place
following the creation of EuropeAid Cooperation Office, for example as regards procedures
for adopting and amending contracts.
Due to the highly sensitive issues involved and the complexity of situations, decisions are
often taken at the highest level in headquarters. Nonetheless, de-concentration of most
31 Cotonou Agreement - Annex IV, Article 5§2 and main text of the Agreement Articles 72§6 and 73§1.
32 Cotonou Agreement - Annex IV, Article 4§1(d).
33 Cotonou Agreement - Annex IV, Article 3§4.
34 Cotonou Agreement, Final Act, Declaration XXI
35 Cotonou Agreement - Annex IV, Article 3§2(b) and main text of the Agreement Articles 72§6
and 73§1.
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decision-making from the headquarters to the field level is a main condition for success, as
can be seen in Kosovo. The extensive devolution of decision-making to delegations foreseen
in the reform of the management of Community assistance will have a positive impact on the
linkage issue. Delegations in co-ordination with Member States will play a crucial role in the
formulation of the Addendum to the CSP and in the definition and choice of projects and
programmes.
Specific changes within existing regulations and in the internal decision-making procedures
will be considered with a view to increasing the capacity of the Community to respond in a
timely fashion to post-crises situations.
4.4. Higher risks in transitional environments: Trade-offs between flexibility, speed
and control
An efficient intervention in post-crisis situations implies the acceptance of a higher degree of
« technical » risk in the implementation of co-operation, notwithstanding the political risk
inherent to the country’s general situation. It is difficult to act with flexibility and quickly in
volatile situations while maintaining strong control and accountability.
This higher technical risk concerns firstly the proposed accelerated procedure for the adoption
of an Addendum to the Country Strategy Paper, and the attached work programme. In such a
framework, consultations will necessarily be reduced, including, in some difficult cases, with
the partner authorities. Furthermore sectoral and other impact studies cannot systematically be
carried out before the identification of projects. Feasibility studies, technical design, control
of quality in the field, and checking the effective capacity of the implementing partner are all
steps which require time.
Secondly it concerns procedures in general. The possibility of providing more flexibility
within existing contracts, without necessarily affecting use of similar contracts outside linkage
operations, need to be examined. This may mean permitting changes to projects’ content or
location or accepting a failure to meet objectives or requirements concerning assets. This is a
way to avoid a multiplication of riders to contracts, and associated delays.
High political risks are unavoidable. Post-crisis situations often mean that one has to deal with
potentially unstable partners. Governments can be short-lived. It also has to be accepted that
in certain cases, post-crisis assistance can lead to the consolidation of less than satisfactory
governments. In cases of emerging governance, the choice of a partner can be highly
sensitive. The government is weak. NGOs are absent or manipulated. UN agencies should be
called upon to provide legitimacy and a framework for donors, if appropriate in a “Friends
of…” formation.
For all these reasons, it has to be accepted that some decisions have to be made even if the
outcome of the intervention is uncertain. A degree of understanding of this is essential if the
Commission is to act meaningfully in difficult circumstances.
The Community and its Member States have to make a choice in the trade off between
increasing the speed and flexibility of action and ensuring a maximum degree of control and
quality. They need to accept the risks involved or decide not to intervene.
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5. CONCLUSION - SUMMARY OF POLICY PROPOSALS
Insufficient donor co-ordination and the lack of adequate instruments to respond
quickly and efficiently to post-crisis situations reduces the effectiveness and impact
of assistance. Experience shows that some improvements have occurred in ensuring
the link between relief, rehabilitation and development. However, much remains to
be done. All donors are faced with the same type of problems.
Due to its importance both as a donor of emergency assistance and of development
assistance, as well as to its broad international presence, the EC has a particular
responsibility in this regard.
With a view to optimising the EC's contribution to a more efficient response to post-
crisis situations, the Commission proposes the following steps:
• In countries prone to natural disasters, increased attention will be paid to disaster
preparedness and prevention both in humanitarian assistance, and particularly in
development co-operation strategies and programmes.
• In conflict situations, the link between relief and development must be seen in a
broader economic, social and political context. These factors must be taken into
consideration in the different phases and in the different areas of intervention.
• ECHO should focus on its core mandate. Assistance to countries where there is
no humanitarian emergency should be phased out. If the EC is nonetheless
committed to continue its assistance, appropriate longer term instruments will
have to be mobilised in a timely fashion, where the legal framework to do so
exists.
• Emergency assistance must increasingly be designed in such a way that a take-
over is consistent with long term development objectives and sustainability.
Development policy must in turn be better adapted to cope with these issues.
• In order to address the problem of insufficient donor co-ordination in post-crisis
situations, the “Friends of” approach, in the UN framework, must be strengthened
on a more systematic basis while keeping the case-by-case principle. The
Commission should play an active role in strengthening the “Friends of”
approach, acting in complementarity with Member States
• Better co-ordinated international initiatives must involve the various multilateral,
regional and non-governmental actors in order to strengthen synergies and to
allow clearer definition of phase-in and phase-out measures.
• In the context of the refocusing of Community development activities on a more
limited number of areas, increased co-ordination and complementarity between
the EC and its Member States will aim at a division of labour, with a view to
providing a better EU response to existing needs in the different phases.
• The European Commission will review its own instruments and procedures with a
view to reduce time delays, mobilise adequate resources in a timely fashion, and
ensure the involvement of appropriate partners. This will take place in the
framework of the reform of external assistance, in particular in relation to the de-
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concentration of decision-making and staff to delegations, and to changes in
comitology procedures.
• As soon as ECHO or the RRM starts intervening, an Addendum to the Country
Strategy Paper, including an indicative work programme will be elaborated and
adopted, using as much as legally possible simplified and accelerated procedures.
It will cover the actions envisaged and the different instruments to be used so that
subsequent approval of individual projects is not required, only information.
• In order to implement this Addendum and work programme, a simplified
decision-making process is to be applied within the Commission for approval of
individual projects and programmes. Implementation procedures will be reviewed
to increase flexibility in particular for selecting implementing bodies, tendering
procedures, amendments of contracts. This will apply to key thematic instruments
such as rehabilitation, aid to refugees, food aid/food security, and demining.
• As regards the take-over within the large EC regional programmes, adequate
provisions have already been incorporated in some of them (CARDS, Cotonou,
MEDA); they should be implemented with all the flexibility required. For others
(Tacis, ALA), a review might be considered in order to address the question in
how far future new Regulations should be extended to cover rehabilitation, aid to
refugees and mines, as an alternative to a thematic regrouping of such type of
activities.
In order to improve its capacity to respond in a timely and efficient manner to post-crisis
situations, the Community and its Member States have to accept a higher degree of technical
risk. There is a trade off between increasing the speed and flexibility of action and ensuring a
maximum degree of control and quality.
The Commission is submitting these considerations to the European Parliament and the
Council. It would welcome further discussions on the ideas put forward in this
Communication with a view to translate them into real improvement of its capacity to
influence positively the outcome of the crises its partner countries are facing.
